Synthesis of coordinated management mechanisms in organizational systems with an arbitrator

The issues of synthesis of coordinated management mechanisms of organizational systems in systems with an Arbitrator are presented, which are the development of the theoretical and methodological basis for the synthesis of management mechanisms in hierarchical games. The proposed approach is based on coordinating the interests of the managing center and the performers of the work using an intermediary, an arbitrator, since each of the parties is interested in distorting information in their favor. The purpose of most agreed management mechanisms is to improve the quality and efficiency of management, therefore it is important to monitor their implementation by a third disinterested party. Ensuring supervision and control over the organizers and performers of the work by an arbitrator who is not interested in making a profit allows for increased transparency and quality of management. The mechanisms of coordinated management, which are described in the classical theory of management of organizational systems, assume that the interests of the management center and agents are taken into account fairly, i.e. in equal measure and proportions. However, no one prevents the center from adjusting or changing the rules of the game in the process of developing the organizational system, effectively imposing its own rules of the game on agency teams. The disadvantages of classical organizational system management mechanisms include, in particular, the lack of control over the use of such mechanisms by the center in relation to agency teams performing work. Thus, the theory of management of organizational systems offers specific management mechanisms (incentives, planning, etc. based on their assumption that the center is an impeccable, ideal and effective participant in the interaction, which does not fully correspond to reality. A new class of organizational management systems is being considered – systems with an arbitrator. The key difference between such systems and those considered earlier is the implementation of mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the rules of the game by all participants in the interaction, and not just monitoring the activities of agency teams, as is done in classical game theory.