The Range of Moral Responsibility: A Beauvoirian Model

ABSTRACT In this paper, I propose a view that extends the range of our core agency to include contributions our actions make to public values. This Extended Range View takes seriously Simone de Beauvoir's suggestion that values are not merely handed to us but created and shaped together by our actions. If we properly appreciate the moral weight of our contributions to the value systems that we all engage in—what I will call our evaluative landscape—then we can explain how we can be responsible for the free actions of others. This view significantly extends what we will need to think of as our responsibility (though not to a fully un restricted range). I will also suggest, however, that we accept a pluralist view about responsibility on which the way that we take responsibility and hold agents responsible for these kinds of value‐based contributions is different from the standard responsibility practices like blame, punishment, and guilt.

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Publication Details

Journal
European Journal of Philosophy
Published
2025-09-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70023
Primary Topic
Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Range of Moral Responsibility: A Beauvoirian Model

Hannah Winckler‐Olick
European Journal of Philosophy
Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre
article

The Range of Moral Responsibility: A Beauvoirian Model

Hannah Winckler‐Olick
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, I propose a view that extends the range of our core agency to include contributions our actions make to public values. This Extended Range View takes seriously Simone de Beauvoir's suggestion that values are not merely handed to us but created and shaped together by our actions. If we properly appreciate the moral weight of our contributions to the value systems that we all engage in—what I will call our evaluative landscape—then we can explain how we can be responsible for the free actions of others. This view significantly extends what we will need to think of as our responsibility (though not to a fully un restricted range). I will also suggest, however, that we accept a pluralist view about responsibility on which the way that we take responsibility and hold agents responsible for these kinds of value‐based contributions is different from the standard responsibility practices like blame, punishment, and guilt.

European Journal of PhilosophyVol. 34(1)
Cornell University (US), Sage (United Kingdom) (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 78%
Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre
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