Making Concepts Sensible? Two Problem Cases for Matherne's Account

Abstract In her recent book, Samantha Matherne argues that the primary cognitive function of the imagination in Kant's philosophy is to exhibit concepts, that is, to make them sensible. She further argues that exhibition is the unifying thread in Kant's treatment of the imagination in the theoretical, aesthetic, and practical domains. In this paper, I present two problem cases for her interpretation. First, I argue that it is a mistake to think of perception as a case of exhibition. I focus on Matherne's claim that forming perceptual images requires empirical schemata and argue that this conflicts with Kant's remarks in the “Schematism” chapter and makes it hard to account for empirical concept formation. Second, I argue that the free play of the faculties in the experience of natural beauty is not a case of exhibition, as this would violate Kant's claim that judgments of beauty are not conceptual judgments.