Overcoming Democratic Short-termism through Constitutional Law?—The Difficulty of Making the Constitutional Veto Work in Climate Protection Cases

Abstract Democratic decision-making processes tend to take less account of future interests than of present ones, thereby jeopardizing not least the foundations of future democracy. Democratic short-termism causes considerable problems, especially when decisions made now have serious consequences for the future and can hardly be reversed. Thus, the current climate protection legislation, which is far too weak worldwide, threatens to impose unbearable and unjust burdens on people in the future and deprive them of any political leeway for shaping their own policies, thus also undermining the very basis of democracy. In general, it is one of the functions of constitutional law to help overcome such short-termism of decision-making processes. However, in the case of climate protection, this is difficult because the veto power of constitutional law and constitutional courts has comparatively little impact here—for reasons related to the factual characteristics of climate protection. Nevertheless, constitutional law and courts have their own potential in climate protection that needs to be further developed in order to overcome some of the democratic short-termism.