Die Genese der strengen Endlichkeit in Schellings <i>Philosophie und Religion</i>

Abstract Schelling’s system of identity, initiated in 1801, soon encounters several ontological challenges following the publication of the dialogue Bruno in 1802. These issues revolve around the distinction between the Absolute and the world, and the very existence of the finite. The central theme of Schelling’s Philosophy and Religion – and of this paper – is the concept of the Fall. Schelling develops this idea by drawing an analogy with Christian dogma; in his philosophy, however, it signifies the emergence of meaning and explains the existence of a finite world. Moreover, freedom, inherently linked to finitude, now depends on the establishment of a “real absolute” where nature, the world, and humanity are recognised as the proper domain of freedom, in contrast to the original, self-contained “ideal absolute”. Comparing this development with Schelling’s earlier identity system, we argue that between 1802 and 1804 he shifts toward a more dualistic stance, thereby departing from mainstream German Idealism years before the Freedom Essay .