Is Freedom Nothing?

This paper raises and discusses the possibility that freedom and nothing are the same phenomenon. Consequently, whether this identification is true or false affects the fundamental understanding of the nature of free will and tests whether moral life is absurd or not. In the introductory section, the problem and the methodology are briefly presented. In the first two parts, the problem of the nature of freedom is explored and its similarity to nothing is brought closer, first through the debate on free will and then through Kant’s cosmological theory of freedom. Having the similarity given in brief, the next two parts explore the relation between freedom and nothing, first by examining the problem of the existence of nothing in order to further emphasize the convergence of the two concepts, and then by defining the results of the relevant possibilities for their sameness. The concluding suggestions are that: (1) positively oriented theories of freedom in the Western philosophical tradition should be carefully revised, because the absorption of nothing into freedom either relegates them to the disposition of determinism, rendering the concept impossible, or challenges to accept it on the basis of personal belief, rather than justified argument; and (2) a universal solution to the problem of free will most likely require close communication with the Eastern philosophical tradition, which has made significant theoretical contributions to the problem of the relation between freedom and nothing.