The perceived power of clients, administrative burden and take-up of social benefits

This work offers a new theoretical contribution that advances our understanding of the take-up of social rights. According to standard theoretical models, the decision of clients whether to collect the social benefits to which they are entitled is influenced by the policy design and administrative levels. Our argument is that the clients are not only affected by, but also have potential influence on policy design and the extent of the administrative burden, which may have positive consequences on the degree of take-up. Both policymakers and administrators may consider the political reaction of ‘clients’ to the chosen policy and bureaucratic process, suggesting that the relationship between the ‘clients’ and policy design and administrative levels is bi-directional rather than uni-directional, as assumed in conventional theoretical frameworks. Incorporating this notion of influential ‘clients’ may help explain the wide variation in take-up across social programs, countries and over time. An analysis of responses provided by senior managers in 75 municipalities in Israel reveals that the administration is indeed directly and indirectly affected by the perceived power of clients. The potential appeal of clients to local politicians shapes the degree of administrative burden related to residential property tax discounts. In most municipalities, the administration tends to promote the take-up of property tax benefits despite the expected loss of tax revenues. This is manifested in various forms, such as active assistance, initiatives to reduce administrative barriers such as online submission of applications, expanding the variety of sources of information on property tax discounts, and utilizing administrative data to automatically extend discounts. This theoretical insight also contributes to the literature on administrative burden, which also treats the client as a powerless actor, and to the literature on policy feedback, which often predicts that contact with bureaucracy may suppress political participation.