A psychological explanation of the problem of free will

The problem of free will involves reconciling a scientific view of the mind as composed ofmechanisms with the notion of agents who enjoy freedom. Difficulty in reconciling these views hasled to perennial waves of debate over whether free will really exists, and what evidence mightadjudicate this question. Here, we adopt a novel approach to the problem by treating the perceptionof the problem of free will itself as a psychological phenomenon. Evolved systems for reasoningabout the self and the social world treat predictable, mechanistic relationships as antithetical toagency and free will. As a consequence, one has the experience of making up one’s mind with thepossibility of doing otherwise, and of influencing others by intervening upon what they think andbelieve. In contrast, evolved systems for reasoning about artifacts and physical relationships treatmental phenomena as emerging out of predictable mechanisms that lack the capacity to dootherwise, and need not be intervened upon via thoughts and beliefs. Different cognitive systemsare thereby producing conflicting intuitions about how to conceptualize the mind, and theseconflicting outputs give rise to the free will problem. The arguments for and against free will areunderstandable in light of this analysis: they emphasize different evidentiary standards whichthemselves stem from different psychological adaptations for understanding reality. Understandingthe psychological basis of the problem, we suggest, goes a long way towards solving the problem offree will.