France’s debt-for-development contracts: From blame avoidance to credit claiming?

Abstract At the dawn of the new millennium, Northern states rallied around the need for unprecedented measures to write off African debt, particularly targeting Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. France stood apart from this collective trend, choosing not to cancel but to convert this debt via debt-for-development contracts (the so-called C2D). When faced with a backlash over this decision, France responded by deploying blame avoidance strategies. But how do such strategies operate in risk-filled international development contexts? What made France’s approach so controversial and what strategies did it prioritise? And how far did blame avoidance give way to credit claiming over time? To answer these questions and provide a better understanding of donor behaviour, we draw upon textual analysis, a parsimonious conceptual framework, and interviews with key officials and non-state actors. We explore the introduction of the C2D and its subsequent implementation in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. We identify shifts in the balance between blame avoidance and credit claiming, explain these in terms of blame ‘risk’ and ‘reversion’, and ask what they mean for wider donor-recipient relations.