The Social Dynamics of Executive Perks: Fostering Innovation Through Stewardship

ABSTRACT This paper, drawing on stewardship theory, explores how executive perks serve as nonmonetary incentives to drive corporate innovation, particularly by enhancing social dynamics. By positioning perks as role‐based incentives that foster intrinsic motivation, this study reveals their potential to reduce managerial myopia and encourage risk‐taking innovation activities. We show that this effect is not simply a result of confidence sentiment from perks and is more pronounced in firms with higher agency costs. Furthermore, while perks enhance innovation efforts and outcomes, they may also reduce innovation efficiency, highlighting a trade‐off between motivation and resource allocation in executive compensation design.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
European Financial Management
Published
2025-08-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70011
Primary Topic
Innovation and Knowledge Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

The Social Dynamics of Executive Perks: Fostering Innovation Through Stewardship

Jin Chen, Lirong Shi, Wei Huang, Chia‐Hsuan Lai
European Financial Management
Innovation and Knowledge Management
article

The Social Dynamics of Executive Perks: Fostering Innovation Through Stewardship

Jin Chen, Lirong Shi, Wei Huang, Chia‐Hsuan Lai
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper, drawing on stewardship theory, explores how executive perks serve as nonmonetary incentives to drive corporate innovation, particularly by enhancing social dynamics. By positioning perks as role‐based incentives that foster intrinsic motivation, this study reveals their potential to reduce managerial myopia and encourage risk‐taking innovation activities. We show that this effect is not simply a result of confidence sentiment from perks and is more pronounced in firms with higher agency costs. Furthermore, while perks enhance innovation efforts and outcomes, they may also reduce innovation efficiency, highlighting a trade‐off between motivation and resource allocation in executive compensation design.

European Financial ManagementVol. 32(1)
University of Nottingham Ningbo China (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 66%
Innovation and Knowledge Management
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.