The Social Dynamics of Executive Perks: Fostering Innovation Through Stewardship
ABSTRACT This paper, drawing on stewardship theory, explores how executive perks serve as nonmonetary incentives to drive corporate innovation, particularly by enhancing social dynamics. By positioning perks as role‐based incentives that foster intrinsic motivation, this study reveals their potential to reduce managerial myopia and encourage risk‐taking innovation activities. We show that this effect is not simply a result of confidence sentiment from perks and is more pronounced in firms with higher agency costs. Furthermore, while perks enhance innovation efforts and outcomes, they may also reduce innovation efficiency, highlighting a trade‐off between motivation and resource allocation in executive compensation design.
Authors
- Jin Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6633-4298)
- Lirong Shi
- Wei Huang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6118-6230)
- Chia‐Hsuan Lai
Institutions
- University of Nottingham Ningbo China (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- European Financial Management
- Published
- 2025-08-30
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70011
- Primary Topic
- Innovation and Knowledge Management
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00