Tenant Riskiness, Contract Length, and the Term Structure of Commercial Leases

This paper explores the connection between tenant riskiness, commercial lease length, and the term structure of lease contracts. Theory shows that the possibility of default on a long-term lease generates a risk/lease-length connection. The empirical work uses a large CompStak lease data set combined with tenant characteristics (including risk) from Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). Regressions show that lease length is inversely related to the D&B risk measures, as predicted, and that risky tenants pay a higher rent premium for long-term contracts than low-risk tenants. The presence of such tenants thus raises the slope of the term structure of commercial rents. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04959 .

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Management Science
Published
2025-08-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04959
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.13
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Tenant Riskiness, Contract Length, and the Term Structure of Commercial Leases

Jan K. Brueckner, Stuart S. Rosenthal
1 citations
Management Science
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
3.13
article

Tenant Riskiness, Contract Length, and the Term Structure of Commercial Leases

Jan K. Brueckner, Stuart S. Rosenthal
article en
1 citations

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between tenant riskiness, commercial lease length, and the term structure of lease contracts. Theory shows that the possibility of default on a long-term lease generates a risk/lease-length connection. The empirical work uses a large CompStak lease data set combined with tenant characteristics (including risk) from Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). Regressions show that lease length is inversely related to the D&B risk measures, as predicted, and that risky tenants pay a higher rent premium for long-term contracts than low-risk tenants. The presence of such tenants thus raises the slope of the term structure of commercial rents. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04959 .

Management Science
University of California, Irvine (US), Cornell University (US), Irvine University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
3.13
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.