CORRUPTION: ANALYSIS AND REMEDIES

Although anticorruption has grown into a global industry backed by considerable funding, its effectiveness, especially in developing and postcommunist countries, still remains limited. This paper sheds light on a major reason, which is the widespread neglect of the political and structural origins of corruption, particularly the prevalence of particularism, a system in which public resources are allocated based on favoritism rather than impartial rules. In these settings, corruption is not an exception but a built-in feature of the political order, sustained by elite alliances and informal networks of influence. Further, this study underlines Western-style reform models that often fail because they overlook the complicated realities of transitional and hybrid political systems. Based on both personal experience in leading anticorruption initiatives and cross-country comparisons, this article emphasizes the urgent need for strategies that are sensitive to local contexts and political dynamics. In turn, the paper also advocates for long-term measures, including external pressure, public engagement, and incentives for ethical behavior. Ultimately, tackling corruption effectively depends on broader processes of democratization and modernization, without which reforms are unlikely to produce meaningful or lasting change on the whole.