Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks

Abstract Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our conceptual framework suggests brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans’ reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans. We combine village network data from brokers and citizens with broker reports of vote buying, allowing us to use broker and citizen fixed effects. We show that networks diffuse information about citizens to brokers who leverage it to target transfers. In particular, among those citizens who are not registered to their party, brokers target reciprocal citizens about whom they can learn more through their network, and these citizens are more likely to support the brokers’ party. Moreover, recruited brokers are significantly more central than other citizens among non-copartisans, but not among copartisans. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying, broker recruitment, and ultimately for political outcomes.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Review of Economic Studies
Published
2025-08-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf075
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Media Influence and Politics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.20

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article

Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks

Laura Schechter, Raúl Duarte, Horacio Larreguy, Frederico Finan
1 citations
The Review of Economic Studies
Media Influence and Politics
4.20
article

Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks

Laura Schechter, Raúl Duarte, Horacio Larreguy, Frederico Finan
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our conceptual framework suggests brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans’ reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans. We combine village network data from brokers and citizens with broker reports of vote buying, allowing us to use broker and citizen fixed effects. We show that networks diffuse information about citizens to brokers who leverage it to target transfers. In particular, among those citizens who are not registered to their party, brokers target reciprocal citizens about whom they can learn more through their network, and these citizens are more likely to support the brokers’ party. Moreover, recruited brokers are significantly more central than other citizens among non-copartisans, but not among copartisans. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying, broker recruitment, and ultimately for political outcomes.

The Review of Economic Studies
Berkeley College (US), University of Wisconsin–Madison (US), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (MX), Harvard University Press (US), Madison Group (United States) (US), YWCA Madison (US), University of Wisconsin Health (US), University of California, Berkeley (US)
Sage Foundation, Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Media Influence and Politics
4.20
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Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks — Laura Schechter, Raúl Duarte, et al. · The Review of Economic Studies (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS