Miracles, Metaphysics, and Method in Wolff and Kant

Abstract Kant’s critical procedure aims to determine the conditions and boundaries of reason’s use in synthetic a priori cognition through an antecedent critique of reason. The prevailing view maintains that his arch-dogmatic predecessor, Christian Wolff, fell short of the critical procedure because he overlooked the possibility of synthetic truth altogether. I first argue that Wolff in fact accepts synthetic truths. On his miracle account of synthetic truth, miracles would provide grounds of synthetic truths. His rejection of synthetic a priori cognition instead depends on this account of synthetic truth and his analysis of the conditions on a priori cognition. Wolff therefore comes closer to the critical procedure than commonly supposed. But I then argue that Wolff’s miracle account of synthetic truth precludes an antecedent critique of reason. By extension, Kant’s critical procedure is made possible not merely by his introduction of synthetic truths, but by his naturalization of them.