Does Regulator as a Minority Shareholder Affect Bond Yield Spreads? A Quasi‐Natural Experiment

ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue To strengthen the protection of minority shareholders, in 2016, the China Securities Regulatory Commission authorized the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a non‐profit institution with official backing, to buy and hold 100 shares of listed firms in pilot regions. By exercising shareholder rights, the CSISC plays a governance role as a regulatory minority shareholder. This study examines whether CSISC shareholding has a spillover effect in the bond market and whether this effect varies across firms with different levels of information asymmetry, insider expropriation, shareholder–creditor agency conflicts, and trustee reputation. Research Findings/Insights Employing a difference‐in‐differences analysis on bonds issued by listed firms between 2015 and 2017, we find that CSISC shareholding is associated with lower bond yield spreads. Cross‐sectional tests suggest that CSISC shareholding reduces bond yield spreads by mitigating information asymmetry, curbing insider expropriation, and alleviating shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. We also find that trustee reputation moderates the relationship between CSISC shareholding and bond yield spreads. Furthermore, CSISC shareholding influences the nonpricing terms of bonds, and the difference in bond yield spreads between the treatment and control groups diminishes following the nationwide implementation of CSISC shareholding. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study contributes to the growing literature on the economic consequences of CSISC shareholding by uncovering its spillover governance effect on bondholder protection. It also extends the research on the role of government regulation in safeguarding bondholder interests. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our study has important policy implications for investor protection in other emerging markets. Given the unique characteristics of China's bond market, directly replicating this mechanism may not yield similarly favorable outcomes elsewhere. Nevertheless, regulators in other emerging markets could draw on China's experience and consider implementing novel investor protection mechanisms tailored to their specific market conditions.