Homogeneous Polynomial Parameter-Dependent Control Strategy for Active Vehicle Suspension Systems in Cyber-Physical Architecture Subject to Malicious Attacks

This article is devoted to studying the homogeneous polynomial parameter-dependent (HPPD)-type control strategy of active vehicle suspension systems (AVSSs) within a cyber-physical architecture that is subjected to malicious attacks. A framework based on cyber-physical systems is proposed for designing the controller parameters of an AVSS, considering the vulnerability of control signals in the transport layer to malicious cyberattacks. To address the hybrid attacks consisting of denial of service and false data injection (FDI), a resilient controller with FDI attack compensation is designed, and an augmented error system model under hybrid attacks is established. Subsequently, to further enhance handling stability and ride comfort, a homogeneous polynomial method is introduced, and a novel HPPD-type resilient controller with FDI attack compensation is devised. The co-design method for the HPPD-type controller and FDI attack observer is derived using a time-varying Lyapunov function to ensure the exponential stability of the HPPD-type augmented error system. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method in enhancing stability and improving comfort is verified through software simulations and hardware-in-the-loop experiments, and the superiority of the method in resisting attacks is demonstrated through comparative analysis of some performance indicators.