Impact of Altruistic Preference on the Dynamic Decision and Coordination of Joint Emission Reduction in Low-Carbon Supply Chain

Abstract Under the carbon trading mechanism, this study establishes a decision-making model for a low-carbon supply chain comprising a single manufacturer and a retailer. It analyzes the impact of the retailer's altruistic preferences on decision variables, profits, supply chain coordination, and the complexity of the dynamic decision-making model. The study indicates that the continuous increase in the adjustment parameters of decision variables can destabilize the supply chain system, with the adjustment parameter for wholesale price having a greater impact than the adjustment parameter for carbon emission reduction level. An increase in altruistic preferences reduces the stability region of the supply chain system, yet its influence on supply chain profits varies depending on the system's state. When the system is stable, altruistic preferences have a positive impact on overall profits; when the system is unstable, profits first increase and then decrease. Compared to decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making yields higher profits. Based on this, we innovatively design a side-payment self-enforcing contract mechanism to effectively coordinate the supply chain and promote more efficient cooperation. After implementing this contract, the increase in retailers' altruistic preferences can expand the stability region of the supply chain system, and the impact of the carbon emission reduction level adjustment parameter on system stability is greater than that of the wholesale price adjustment parameter, which is different from the situation before the contract was implemented.