Political Entrepreneurs or Bandits? The “Criminal” Origins of Peripheral Rebellions

How and why do armed groups that become known as “rebels” initially use violence? New datasets show that such violence is often small in scale. Numerous empirical examples indicate that it is also often ambiguous—not easily identified as a precursor to anti-state rebellion. This paper seeks to explain these patterns. We argue that a variety of fledgling nonstate armed groups find small-scale, anonymous anti-state violence useful, despite the risks. Therefore, armed groups that later become distinguishable as “rebels” or “bandits” often initially use this similar repertoire of violence. The resulting ambiguity of this violence—for outsiders from states to scholars—presents an opportunity for aspiring rebels, since states struggle to discern the threat they pose. Ambiguity lessens when aspiring rebels opt to use offensive, larger-scale violence. We illustrate our claims with three historical case studies that enable close examination of early armed group violence, as well as 12 brief case vignettes. Our analyses show the promise of integrating research on rebel origins, criminality, and state formation.