Expressivist concerns for assisted dying on request

The expressivist objection argues against the legalisation of euthanasia and/or assisted suicide (EAS), on the grounds that EAS laws express a disrespectful judgement of certain classes of people: roughly, that they are better off dead. Recently, some ethicists have argued that laws which require <i>only</i> an informed, competent and voluntary request for EAS would avoid the expressivist objection, since that objection depends on the further requirement of irremediable suffering. In this paper, I argue that-for better or for worse-this response fails to address the expressivist objection. This is because reasoning parallel to the original expressivist objection demonstrates that <i>even</i> EAS laws with an informed, competent and voluntary request as the <i>sole</i> requirement express a disrespectful judgement: that it is <i>reasonable to believe</i> that certain classes of people are better off dead. Objections to this argument depend largely on a conception of autonomy which minimises the role of <i>motivations</i>-specifically, motivations which we ought to recognise as reasonable. Although this conception is supported by some bioethicists, it faces challenges of its own. Until those challenges are addressed, therefore, an appeal to less demanding EAS laws does not by itself avoid the expressivist objection.