The Application of Blockchain Technology in Fresh Food Supply Chains: A Game-Theoretical Analysis Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Policy and Consumer Dual Preferences

Against the backdrop of the growing popularity of blockchain technology, this study investigates blockchain adoption strategies for the fresh food supply chain (FFSC) under a carbon cap-and-trade (CAT) policy. Taking a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer as an example, we designed four blockchain adoption modes based on the supplier’s strategy (adopt or not) and the retailer’s strategy (adopt or not). Combining influencing factors such as consumers’ low-carbon preference, consumers’ freshness preference, and carbon trading price (CTP), we established four game-theoretic models. Using backward induction, we derived the equilibrium strategies for the supplier and retailer under different modes and analyzed the impact of key factors on these equilibrium strategies. The analysis yielded four key findings: (1) BB mode (both adopt blockchain) is the optimal adoption strategy for both FFSC parties when carbon prices are high, and consumers exhibit strong dual preferences. It most effectively mitigates the negative price impact of rising carbon prices by synergistically enhancing emission reduction efforts and freshness preservation efforts, thereby increasing overall profits and achieving a Pareto improvement in the benefits for both parties. (2) Consumers’ low-carbon preference and freshness preference exhibit an interaction effect. These two preferences mutually reinforce each other’s incentive effect on FFSC efforts (emission reduction/freshness preservation). Blockchain’s information transparency makes these efforts more perceptible to consumers, forming a synergistic “emission reduction-freshness preservation” cycle that further drives sales and profit growth. (3) The adoption of blockchain by either the supplier or the retailer significantly lowers the cost threshold for the other party to adopt blockchain, thereby increasing their willingness to adopt. (4) CAT and consumer preferences jointly influence the adoption strategies of suppliers and retailers. Additionally, the adoption strategies of FFSC participants are also affected by the other party’s blockchain adoption status. Drawing on the above conclusions, this study provides actionable guidance for suppliers and retailers in selecting optimal blockchain adoption strategies.