Simulation-Based Analysis of OPC UA Set-Up Vulnerability and Its Security Risks in Cyber-Physical Manufacturing Systems
In the era of Industry 4.0 (I4.0), Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are pivotal in enhancing industrial processes by using the Open Platform Communication Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) as the standard communication protocol. OPC-UA is one of the few industrial protocols that incorporates security measures for preventing adversaries from compromising critical infrastructures. However, despite the protocol’s security features and widespread adoption, it continues to reveal cybersecurity challenges and setup vulnerabilities in several products and vendor implementation libraries. Many vendor implementations of OPC-UA are unaware of the security risks associated with noncompliance to the OPC-UA specification or the integration of OPC-UA with other insecure protocols. Therefore, this work demonstrates the weaknesses of OPC-UA in such vendor implementation contexts by analyzing the communication architecture of the adopted OPC-UA library. Specifically, we start by simulating a communication architecture set-up that mimics most vendor OPC-UA implementations, which includes Digital Twin, Cobots, Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems with OPC-UA as the main protocol between MES and Cobots. A suspicious Media Access Control (MAC) address is sniffed in the network, and a malicious packet is then injected by exploiting the final TCP layer of the OPC-UA rogue client closing session, which rendered the entire network vulnerable. To verify the security risk in our communication architecture, we investigate the impact of the vulnerability in the simulation setup by instigating a Denial of Service (DoS) attack through the gradual increase in the number of malicious packets at different loops while noting how the systems react. This reveal flaws in the system operation, ranging from unreliable data exchange to total system collapse. Finally, different mitigation strategies are proposed to avert the attack.
Authors
- Manuel Götz (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9749-0274)
- Sani M. Abdullahi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4962-2794)
- Sanja Lazarova‐Molnar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6052-0863)
Institutions
- Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (DE)
- University of Southern Denmark (DK)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-08-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130040
- Primary Topic
- Digital Transformation in Industry
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- European Commission
- HORIZON EUROPE Framework Programme