Caiba: Multicast Source Authentication for CAN Through Reactive Bit Flipping

Controller Area Networks (CANs) are the back-bone for reliable intra-vehicular communication. Recent cyberattacks have, however, exposed the weaknesses of CAN, which was designed without any security considerations in the 1980s. Current efforts to retrofit security via intrusion detection or message authentication codes are insufficient to fully secure CAN as they cannot adequately protect against masquerading attacks, where a compromised communication device, a so-called electronic control units, imitates another device. To remedy this situation, multicast source authentication is required to reliably identify the senders of messages. In this paper, we present Caiba, a novel multicast source authentication scheme specifically designed for communication buses like CAN. Caiba relies on an authenticator overwriting authentication tags on-the-fly, such that a receiver only reads a valid tag if not only the integrity of a message but also its source can be verified. To integrate Caiba into CAN, we devise a special message authentication scheme and a reactive bit overwriting mechanism. We achieve interoperability with legacy CAN devices, while protecting receivers implementing the AUTOSAR SecOC standard against masquerading attacks without communication overhead or verification delays.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-06-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp63326.2025.00045
Primary Topic
Security and Verification in Computing
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Caiba: Multicast Source Authentication for CAN Through Reactive Bit Flipping

Eric Wagner, Till Zimmermann, Martin Henze, Jan Bauer et al.
Security and Verification in Computing
article

Caiba: Multicast Source Authentication for CAN Through Reactive Bit Flipping

Eric Wagner, Till Zimmermann, Martin Henze, Jan Bauer, Klaus Wehrle, Frederik Basels
article en

Abstract

Controller Area Networks (CANs) are the back-bone for reliable intra-vehicular communication. Recent cyberattacks have, however, exposed the weaknesses of CAN, which was designed without any security considerations in the 1980s. Current efforts to retrofit security via intrusion detection or message authentication codes are insufficient to fully secure CAN as they cannot adequately protect against masquerading attacks, where a compromised communication device, a so-called electronic control units, imitates another device. To remedy this situation, multicast source authentication is required to reliably identify the senders of messages. In this paper, we present Caiba, a novel multicast source authentication scheme specifically designed for communication buses like CAN. Caiba relies on an authenticator overwriting authentication tags on-the-fly, such that a receiver only reads a valid tag if not only the integrity of a message but also its source can be verified. To integrate Caiba into CAN, we devise a special message authentication scheme and a reactive bit overwriting mechanism. We achieve interoperability with legacy CAN devices, while protecting receivers implementing the AUTOSAR SecOC standard against masquerading attacks without communication overhead or verification delays.

Osnabrück University (DE), Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (DE), RWTH Aachen University (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 88%
Security and Verification in Computing
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Caiba: Multicast Source Authentication for CAN Through Reactive Bit Flipping — Eric Wagner, Till Zimmermann, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS