Incentivizing Security Excellence in Cyber Liability Insurance
This paper investigates current practices and inherent shortcomings in Cyber Liability Insurance (CLI), highlighting critical gaps due to inconsistent risk assessment methodologies and weak incentives for cybersecurity excellence. We employ a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative pilot study of 209 businesses, direct policy-purchasing experiments, and structured interviews with 26 Chief Information Security Officers (CISO). The findings reveal significant premium variations—from $600 to nearly $7,000 for identical coverages—due primarily to inconsistent security assessments and policy complexities. Furthermore, empirical policy acquisitions demonstrated that multiple insurers approved coverage with minimal or no cybersecurity diligence, underscoring systemic issues in insurer incentive alignment. Based on these insights, we propose a structured framework advocating customized dynamic cyber liability policies with risk-based premiums, stan-dardized assessments, and incentives aligned with proactive cybersecurity practices. This framework promotes transparency, incentivizes better security practices, and outlines clear directions for future research, contributing toward a more responsive cyber-liability insurance market.
Authors
- Shreyas Kumar
- Guofei Gu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0630-741X)
- Paula deWitte (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1385-7818)
Institutions
- Texas A&M University (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-30
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp63326.2025.00023
- Primary Topic
- Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00