The Retaliation-Compensation-Feedback Model: Construction and Analysis

This study focuses on the game relationship between economic sanctions between China and the United States and domestic policy adjustments, conducts in-depth analysis from the dual dimensions of sub-state actors and domestic political structures, and innovative constructs a Retaliation-Compensation-Feedback (RCF) dynamic model. Research shows that precise economic sanctions targeting pillar industries in key political regions of a target country can effectively change voters' political loyalty and thereby reshape the internal political landscape. Meanwhile, the sanctioned groups' dependence on the federal government is highly dependent on the effectiveness and timeliness of policy compensation. Effective policy compensation helps relieve external pressure, while the failure of compensation will accelerate the reorganization of political alliances. This mechanism reveals the micro-impact path of economic sanctions on the domestic politics of the target country, providing a theoretical basis for precise countermeasures in economic games among major countries, and is of great significance for the formulation of China's foreign economic policies.