The reaction of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR to the events of the Prague spring of 1968 (based on the documents of the branch state archive of the security service of Ukraine)

Background. The Prague Spring of 1968 was an attempt at political liberalization in Czechoslovakia that ended with a military invasion by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, which the Kremlin justified as "international assistance." The Ukrainian leadership, particularly Petro Shelest, supported the intervention, although he also sought to preserve a certain degree of autonomy for the Ukrainian SSR. Party propaganda in the Ukrainian SSR actively justified the Soviet actions, but public sentiment was mixed: a significant part of the intelligentsia sympathized with Dubček's course, and among dissidents, a sense of solidarity with the Czechoslovak reformers grew. Despite the absence of mass protests, verbal forms of resistance were recorded, including listening to foreign radio broadcasts, informal correspondence, and radical acts of protest–most notably, the self-immolation of Vasyl Makukh. The Soviet authorities responded harshly to any signs of dissent: the KGB documented hundreds of cases of "anti-Soviet" expressions, confiscated leaflets, and punished activists. The events in Czechoslovakia became a catalyst for the politicization of Ukrainian society, the intensification of the human rights movement, and the expansion of dissident sentiment. Parallels with the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 confirmed that the Soviet system was prepared to act brutally to maintain control, but at the same time revealed deeper disillusionment within parts of society and the rise of oppositional attitudes – some of which have been documented thanks to the opening of KGB archives. Purpose. To analyze the reaction of the population of the Ukrainian SSR to the events of the 1968 Prague Spring based on recently declassified documents of the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security (KGB), with particular emphasis on regional differences in public sentiment. Methods. The study employs a descriptive-analytical historical method to interpret archival documents, a comparative approach to contrast reactions across different regions, as well as oral history elements and content analysis to evaluate the nature of citizens' statements. Results. The research found that public attitudes in the Ukrainian SSR in 1968 were ambivalent and far from monolithic. Significant regional discrepancies were revealed: while the western regions (in particular Transcarpathia and Lviv region) more frequently exhibited critical and antiregime evaluations of Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia, the central and eastern regions tended to display loyal sentiments and support for the official line – although even there instances of anxiety and dissent were recorded. The Prague Spring acted as a catalyst for latent discontent: alongside open approval of the intervention, there coexisted critical judgments, fear of war, and sympathy for Czechoslovak reforms. Conclusions. The KGB documents demonstrate that the official Soviet propaganda about "unanimous support" for the USSR's actions in Czechoslovakia did not reflect the real sentiments of a portion of the population. The people of the Ukrainian SSR reacted to the Prague Spring events with mixed feelings – from complete support to sharp condemnation. The security organs maintained strict control over public moods: they promptly recorded citizens' statements, identified "unreliable" individuals, and implemented preventive repressive measures. All this indicates the existence of hidden social tension in Soviet Ukraine and a divergence between the official ideology and citizens' genuine assessments.