Behavioral logic and practical strategies: An analysis of foot voting among the early Ming Dynasty population within the household registration system

Foot voting within the household registration system was a common strategy under the early Ming Dynasty's rigid and multi-tiered registration regime. Despite state prohibitions and high costs associated with altering registration status, individuals employed strategic behaviors to reduce burdens and risks linked to household obligations. This study examines such foot voting practices through the construction of a behavioral logic model and a strategy model. It finds that individuals sought to escape dual registrations and convert military households into civilian ones. Strategies included bilateral bargaining with local officials or multiplayer games involving other actors, with decisions guided by minimizing costs and exposure risks. Large households, equipped with more resources, often dominated these strategies, manipulating records or colluding with officials to transfer registration status—sometimes forcibly to smaller households. In contrast, small households were typically passive and vulnerable due to limited agency. This paper reveals the institutional logic behind foot voting in the Ming context and highlights the explanatory power of mathematical modeling in historical analysis.