An assessment on power balance between Kim Jong Un and Kim Jong Il’s winning coalition in early Kim Jong Un period(2011-2016) : Focusing on changes in the composition of WPK 6th Politburo

This study argues, based on data on changes in the composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, that the relationship between the inexperienced young leader Kim Jong Un and the senior elites of Kim Jong Il’s winning coalition was not adversarial. Contrary to common assumptions, the number of purges within the early Politburo under Kim Jong Un was relatively limited. Those who were purged tended to be either marginal figures within Kim Jong Il’s coalition or newly recruited members incorporated after 2009. The majority of replaced Politburo members were retired due to their advanced age, a practice applied even to key supporters of KJU. Key elite figures, including party secretaries who had formed the core of Kim Jong Il’s winning coalition, largely remained in place. While Kim Jong Un clearly asserted his leadership through the functional reorganization of the Politburo, consolidation of control over the military and security apparatus, and selective use of coercive politics, he opted not for a wholesale removal of elder officials but for strategic alliances with key senior cadres and the honorable retirement of less useful officials. Rather than a relationship of open confrontation, the dynamic between Kim Jong Un and the old guard was closer to one of reciprocal obedience and deference.