Response and Diversion: Unilateral Action in Times of Economic Crisis

ABSTRACT It is often taken for granted that presidential power increases during crises. However, most existing research examines these dynamics in the context of war. I expand on these studies by analyzing presidents' unilateral action during economic crises. Using a new data set of significant executive actions issued from 1953 to 2020, I find that presidents increase their use of unilateral action during economic crises. Responding to the crisis at hand, presidents increase the number of executive actions they issue on the economy. They also tend to issue more actions pertaining to international affairs when an economic downturn occurs, suggesting a strategy of diverting attention from the failing economy in an effort to avoid blame for the crisis. These findings reveal the ways an economic crisis shifts a president's policymaking strategy, adding to our knowledge of presidential leadership during crises and unilateral action more generally.