Distributed Resilient Secondary Control of Smart Grid Under FDI Attacks

This paper addresses the critical challenge of False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) targeting both sensors and controllers in islanded smart grids, which threaten the stability of frequency and voltage regulation in distributed secondary control systems. Conventional distributed control strategies are shown to be vulnerable under coordinated FDIAs, leading to desynchronization and control objective failures. To overcome these limitations, a novel distributed resilient secondary control strategy is proposed, integrating attack mitigation directly into the control framework without relying on explicit detection mechanisms. The core contributions include: (1) A comprehensive vulnerability analysis of smart grid secondary control systems under simultaneous sensor-controller FDIAs, supported by Lyapunov-based stability proofs; (2) The development of resilient frequency and voltage controllers capable of compensating attack-induced errors through adaptive estimation and distributed consensus; (3) Rigorous theoretical guarantees for global asymptotic stability under bounded attacks, with convergence rates quantified through eigenvalue analysis of the enhanced Laplacian matrix <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$L$</tex> + <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$G$</tex>. Extensive validation via MATLAB/Simulink simulations demonstrates smart grids system under multiple attack scenarios. This work provides a paradigm shift in smart grid cybersecurity, establishing a detection-free resilient control framework that ensures operational continuity even during sustained cyber attacks.