Phenomenal Conservatism, Theism, and Voodoo-Epistemology

In his article, Alexander Khramov argues that phenomenal conservatism (PhC) – the thesisthat if something seems true to a person (S), S is justified in believing it unless proven other-wise – enhances the problem of religious diversity by rendering rational choice betweenconflicting religious belief systems impossible. He claims this approach leads to “voodooepistemology” (VE) where all religious beliefs become epistemically equivalent and thusequally rational. A. Khramov criticizes PhC for enabling such epistemology, citing Dutchphilosopher Hans van Eyghen’s defense of spirit beliefs as an example. He argues that thisposes a threat to rationality of theism and proposes his own solution to the issue. In re-sponse, I argue that PhC does not inherently lead to VE and that Khramov’s proposed solu-tion is inadequate. Instead, I suggest that PhC can serve as a valuable regulative principle,allowing epistemic agents to evaluate the rationality of religious beliefs based on experi-ences and evidence, thereby facilitating rational choice among diverse religious systems.