On Deep Moral Disagreement Between Theists and Atheists

Abstract Following Robert Fogelin’s “The Logic of Deep Disagreement” (2005), the Wittgensteinian idea of deep disagreement has gathered considerable attention. Philosophers have mostly engaged with the implications of deep disagreement in epistemological discussions. Religious beliefs are usually used as examples in discussions of deep disagreement. This paper will focus on deep moral disagreement between theistic and atheistic frameworks. Three ways deep moral disagreement between theists and atheists could be accounted for will be identified. Deep moral disagreements could take place because of moral hinges or non-moral hinges or could be accounted for in meta-ethical terms. Given the interconnectedness of hinges, singling out a moral hinge and discussing the deep disagreement between theists and atheists based on that hinge could be misleading. To make this point, I will focus on the idea of moral certainty presented and discussed by Nigel Pleasants (2008, 2009, 2015). Finally, the account of moral certainty presented by Pleasants will be challenged by examining divine command theory.