THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF AI, HUMANITY, AND TRANSHUMANITY

This article proposes a distinct category of legal personality for artificial intelligence systems endowed with autonomous agency, designated as Sachpersönlichkeit. Drawing on the classical distinctions among thing, subject, and person in Kant and Hegel, it examines the impacts of technologies such as machines, robots, AI, wearables, and neural implants on the imputation of responsibility. The text employs dogmatic analysis and normative construction to show that attributing legal personality to things must be functional and limited, with safeguards to preserve the rights of natural persons. It argues that the AI-person would have an attributed personality, with asset segregation and the possibility of technical insolvency, enabling the imputation of conduct and the allocation of risks without anthropomorphizing rights. Finally, it presents normative criteria to identify when an intelligent artifact may be granted personality, discusses regulatory implications, and suggests a liability regime based on risk funds and the solidary liability of the human steward.