POLYBIUS ON THE PRICE OF DELIBERATIVE FREEDOM

Abstract Polybius claims that equality to speak in public ( ἰσηγορία ) and freedom of speech ( παρρησία ) are the fulcrum of a democracy (2.38.6) and hence the most beautiful of political values (6.57.9). But his reasons for valuing them so dearly have remained obscure. This article argues that ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in Polybius maximize the role of persuasion—instead of sheer force—in the polity; that they favour rational decision-making; and that they keep excessive ambition at bay. Those important political goods disappear when the citizens who enjoy ἰσηγορία and παρρησία become tepid in their commitment to the equal right to speak freely. The article argues that, for Polybius, that commitment fades when the citizens take ἰσηγορία and παρρησία for granted, mostly on account of habit ( τὸ σύνηθϵς , 6.9.5). Polybius sets himself the task of dishabituating his readers from ἰσηγορία and παρρησία , by showing that they are always fragile.