Privacy-Preserving Authorized Set Matching via Dishonest Majority Multiparty Computation

Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables each party with a private set to compute the intersection without disclosing other information. However, even in maliciously secure PSI, it does not guarantee input authenticity and output integrity, which becomes problematic in certain scenarios. For instance, in Web 3.0, one of the essential requirements is to find common certifiers among the parties. However, if certifier identities are meant to be protected, some parties may attempt to forge certifier identities or intentionally exclude a particular certifier during protocol execution. Recently, the Private Certifier Intersection (PCI), a variant of PSI, has been proposed to address this problem. Nevertheless, it incurs significantly high computational and communication overhead. This work proposes the <i>Private Identity Intersection</i> (PII), which takes private identifiers and corresponding anonymous signatures from mutually distrusting parties as input, verifies them, and delivers the intersection of the successfully verified identifiers to all parties while ensuring the integrity of the output. Furthermore, PII can naturally extend from two to multiple-party settings while resisting the collusion attack. To achieve the ideal functionality of PII, we implement a user-friendly MPC framework called <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathsf {Oryx}$</tex-math></inline-formula> without third-party libraries. Based on <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathsf {Oryx}$</tex-math></inline-formula>, we instantiate PII with two digital signature schemes, one proposed in this paper. Compared to existing work, our PII protocols reduce the computation overhead by up to <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$163\times$</tex-math></inline-formula> and the communication overhead by up to <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$190\times$</tex-math></inline-formula>, representing an improvement of two orders of magnitude. To demonstrate the practicality of our work, we evaluate its performance in WAN environments with bandwidths of 100 Mbps and 500 Mbps, under a fixed latency of 20 ms.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2025-08-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2025.3599183
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.96
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article

Privacy-Preserving Authorized Set Matching via Dishonest Majority Multiparty Computation

Guowei Ling, Liyao Xiang, Peng Tang, Shi-Feng Sun et al.
2 citations
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
4.96
article

Privacy-Preserving Authorized Set Matching via Dishonest Majority Multiparty Computation

Guowei Ling, Liyao Xiang, Peng Tang, Shi-Feng Sun, Jinyong Shan, Weidong Qiu, Fei Tang
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables each party with a private set to compute the intersection without disclosing other information. However, even in maliciously secure PSI, it does not guarantee input authenticity and output integrity, which becomes problematic in certain scenarios. For instance, in Web 3.0, one of the essential requirements is to find common certifiers among the parties. However, if certifier identities are meant to be protected, some parties may attempt to forge certifier identities or intentionally exclude a particular certifier during protocol execution. Recently, the Private Certifier Intersection (PCI), a variant of PSI, has been proposed to address this problem. Nevertheless, it incurs significantly high computational and communication overhead. This work proposes the <i>Private Identity Intersection</i> (PII), which takes private identifiers and corresponding anonymous signatures from mutually distrusting parties as input, verifies them, and delivers the intersection of the successfully verified identifiers to all parties while ensuring the integrity of the output. Furthermore, PII can naturally extend from two to multiple-party settings while resisting the collusion attack. To achieve the ideal functionality of PII, we implement a user-friendly MPC framework called <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathsf {Oryx}$</tex-math></inline-formula> without third-party libraries. Based on <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathsf {Oryx}$</tex-math></inline-formula>, we instantiate PII with two digital signature schemes, one proposed in this paper. Compared to existing work, our PII protocols reduce the computation overhead by up to <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$163\times$</tex-math></inline-formula> and the communication overhead by up to <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$190\times$</tex-math></inline-formula>, representing an improvement of two orders of magnitude. To demonstrate the practicality of our work, we evaluate its performance in WAN environments with bandwidths of 100 Mbps and 500 Mbps, under a fixed latency of 20 ms.

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure ComputingVol. 22(6)
Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN), Shanghai Jiao Tong University (CN), Beijing Microelectronics Technology Institute (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
4.96
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