An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to investigate the behavior of industries for energy-saving measures and determining energy supply strategy

• Examining the government effect on producers’ adoption in energy-saving measures. • The dynamic behavior of industrial producers, focusing on CHP and SP strategies. • 1st strategy of industrial producers is energy purchase from CHP suppliers. • 2nd strategy of industrial producers is energy purchase from traditional SP suppliers. • Industrial producers decide their product price and energy saving level. Efficient energy provision methods can lead to significant cost savings for commercial and industrial operations. This study aims to analyze the dynamic behavior of industrial producers and their decision-making regarding energy supply strategies under government intervention. Specifically, we investigate how producers choose between two strategies: sourcing energy from a combined heat and power (CHP) producer or purchasing energy from separate heat and power producers (SP). The objective is to assess the impact of these strategies on productivity, energy savings, and government subsidy effectiveness. The first strategy focuses on enhancing productivity through energy savings, with government support in the form of subsidies linked to energy savings and discounts on energy costs. Using a one-population evolutionary game theory approach, we examine how producers set prices and adopt CHP or SP strategies over time. The findings reveal that subsidies tied to CO 2 reduction significantly accelerate the system's evolutionary dynamics compared to subsidies based solely on energy savings. This research provides a novel framework for understanding the long-term adoption of energy-efficient strategies and offers practical insights for policymakers aiming to promote sustainable industrial practices.