Distribution Double Bind: On the Ethical Implications of “How”^<b>†</b>

Abstract When weighing how much aid we should give, policymakers also wonder: how should the state distribute that aid? Issues of implementation and feasibility are, after all, an essential component of policy decision‐making and effectiveness. Yet, when philosophers of education consider the ethical trade‐offs between these postsecondary policies, few have incorporated these considerations into their accounts. In this article, I seek to advance the larger project that questions of implementation and feasibility pose discrete problems of justice that are therefore worth considering when philosophers weigh the trade‐offs between pursuing different postsecondary options. I do this through introducing one such problem within this much wider anticipated genre: the problem of what I call “the distribution double bind” when pursuing means‐tested financial aid in the United States. I argue that the distribution double bind arises when the available options to distribute a given benefit — in this case, financial aid via the FAFSA — are either meaningfully coarse or meaningfully fine. I contend this new dilemma generates distinct ethical concerns that are relevant to our philosophical considerations of how the state should fund higher education.