Contrarianism, conspiracy theories, and epistemic forgeries

Abstract Contrarian CT Views maintain that those things typically referred to as “conspiracy theories” deserve a pejorative connotation because they oppose or reject their epistemically superior official counterparts. Taking a position contrary to an official account characterized by epistemic superiority and rigor is only irrational insofar as there is a contending theory that makes good on those epistemic promises. Three problem cases are presented where we find a conspiracy theory in one corner, but no epistemic promised land in the form of a rival and officially sanctioned explanation in the other. A fourth problem emerges with the introduction of the concept of epistemic forgeries , which show how the appearance of officialdom can be deliberately fabricated, misleading both experts and laypeople. These forgeries complicate the epistemic environment in ways that Contrarian CT Views fail to track. This means that we ought to be particularists, not only in the face of conspiracy, but in the face of official explanations too.