Rethinking Epistemic Responsibilist Virtue: From the Performance of Virtuous Acts to the Possession of Virtuous Traits

Abstract According to the traditional conception of epistemic responsibilist virtue, virtuous traits are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Virtuous acts are derived from, or proceed from, virtue. If an agent performs an act based on good epistemic motives but does not possess the virtue, it is merely an act that a virtuous agent would perform, but is not itself virtuous. In contrast, according to the view I propose and call Act First Responsibilism (AFR), virtuous acts are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Acts based on good motives are virtuous regardless of whether they issue from a virtuous trait. The possession of a virtuous trait is defined derivatively in terms of the performance of virtuous acts. With the new dispositional model of virtues I propose, AFR provides the metaphysical foundation for taking virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary. I argue that AFR is not normatively slight, meets the demands of an exemplarist virtue theory, and fares better than the traditional view in explaining, predicting, understanding, and evaluating an agent, as well as considering someone worthy of imitation.