Green Product Innovation Coordination in Aluminum Building Material Supply Chains with Innovation Capability Heterogeneity: A Biform Game-Theoretic Approach

Green product innovation in aluminum building material supply chains is critical for sustainability, particularly amid growing economic and environmental pressures. However, effective coordination is challenged by the presence of multiple agents with divergent interests and heterogeneous innovation capacities. This study proposes coordination mechanisms based on a biform game that integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative elements. Key findings include the following: (1) Greater innovation capability heterogeneity promotes green innovation investment by the stronger manufacturer and enhances overall welfare, but reduce the supplier’s profit. (2) Biform game-based decision making supports the triple bottom line more effectively than decentralized models and offers greater flexibility than centralized ones. (3) A multi-perspective compensation contract, incorporating three decision-making modes, is developed within the biform game. Exogenous decision making helps resolve the endogenous game dilemma, improving coordination outcomes. (4) The coordination framework allows firms to dynamically adjust compensation parameters in response to environmental changes, thereby enhancing supply chain resilience. Our main contribution lies in applying a novel biform game approach to address coordination challenges in green product innovation under innovation capability heterogeneity. In addition, a multi-perspective contract coordination paradigm is proposed to support triple bottom line sustainability.