Like That: Indexicality and Moral Terms

The paper offers a critical and constructive review of Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory, with particular emphasis on her systematic differentiation between value (or Aristotelian) terms, such as virtue or good person, and deontic (or Kantian) terms, such as duty or wrong act. This article focuses on specific elements of Hilary Putnam’s theory of direct reference, such as indexicality and the semantic function of experts within a community of speakers. These elements have been pivotal in inspiring Zagzebski’s foundationalist stance, which prioritizes the identification, admiration and emulation of exemplars as the core of moral philosophy. The foundationalist or “strong” exemplarism proposed by Zagzebski is challenged through a variety of objections, with a prominent focus on value terms. However, it is deontic terms that occupy a central position in a modern, pluralistic society, whose existence presupposes the rejection of what is intolerable to its members. With regard to these terms, the article presents a comparative analysis of Zagzebski’s thought, which is rooted in Aristotle, and that of Ernst Tugendhat, who was influenced by Kant and did not adopt the exemplarist approach. As a result of this dialogue, I hereby put forth a picture of the moral community that is more egalitarian than Zagzebski’s but less undifferentiated than Tugendhat’s, a theorist who assigns no functional role to experts. It can be concluded that Zagzebski has not successfully integrated value terms and deontic terms into a moral unified theory. Nevertheless, exemplarism should not be construed in such a “weak” sense that its scope is limited to the field of moral education alone.