行政层级、政府注意力与地方政府间关系——以中国内地为例

在中国内地，为什么地方政府间关系多样且复杂？现有研究认为，中国分权化改革背景下的利益分歧是影响地方政府间互动关系的根本原因，或者源于重复多次博弈的机会选择。本文沿着行为主义的研究路径，将地方政府间关系视为一个动态过程。在这一过程中，沟通机制和偏好机制是影响地方政府间互动关系的两大机制解释，由此沿伸出结构性的行政层级和过程性的政府注意力两大维度。行政层级和政府注意力导致了地方政府间竞争、合作和依附关系的生成。未来要促进地方政府间关系向合作迈进，需要围绕沟通机制和偏好机制丰富政府工具箱。 In mainland China, Why are interlocal government relations diverse and complex? Existing studies suggest that the fundamental causes shaping interactive relationships between local governments stem either from interest divergence under China's decentralization reforms or from opportunistic choices arising from repeated games. This paper follows the behavioralist research approach, conceptualizing interlocal government relations as a dynamic process. Within this process, communication mechanisms and preference mechanisms emerge as two key explanatory frameworks for understanding intergovernmental interactions, giving rise to two analytical dimensions: the structural dimension of administrative hierarchy and the procedural dimension of government attention. Administrative hierarchy and government attention collectively generate competitive, cooperative, and dependent relationships among local governments. To steer interlocal relations toward greater cooperation in the future, it is essential to enrich the government's toolkit by leveraging both communication and preference mechanisms.