What drives public trust in elections? Experimental evidence from Malawi

International donors have invested heavily in strengthening electoral administration in low-income democracies, aiming to reduce irregularities and build trust. However, we know little about whether these interventions actually improve public perceptions. Using a conjoint choice experiment in Malawi, randomising organisational features of polling stations and their potential for political bias, we examine the determinants of public trust in a low-income setting. Voters are more trusting of stations with well-trained polling staff, independent monitors, security personnel, and transparency measures, effects driven by sanctioning the absence of these basic requirements. Respondents also prioritise procedurally fair measures over those that exclusively benefit their own party or ethnic group, challenging assumptions about the dominance of partisanship and ethnicity in African elections. We contribute to the literature on election administration and public opinion in low-income settings, while highlighting ways in which resource-constrained election bodies can build and maintain public support.