Reluctant acceptance of legal solutions to territorial disputes as signals of foreign policy reorientation

Abstract Why do states that have resisted legal resolution to their territorial disputes come around and submit to legal treatment (arbitration or adjudication)? By accepting legal management, states commit to respect zero-sum third-party decisions on territorial issues, primarily based on the legal strength of their claims. Potentially aware of their legal weakness, eventual losers in legal processes have oftentimes initially resisted legal management. Previous research primarily explains eventual acquiescence as a remedy to domestic political constraints, where legal rulings provide political cover for territorial concessions. This explanation however concerns how states go about making concessions, not why concessions are eventually considered acceptable. I argue that states may accept legal settlement, despite previous hesitation, as a costly international signal of a broader foreign policy change. For disputants that seek a reboot to international relations, acquiescence to legal management can build much needed reputation for cooperative intentions. The argument is explored across two cases of states that accepted legal dispute management, following previous objection to legal treatment: Israel (in the Taba dispute with Egypt), and Libya (in the Aouzou dispute with Chad). Despite different domestic and international contexts, both cases display foreign policy reorientation as a central feature of acquiescence to legal management.