Evolutionary Game Study of Resident Financing Behavior in the Construction and Renewal of Infrastructure from a Sustainable Perspective

The construction of infrastructure in developing countries has experienced a range of financing needs during the development of urbanization. While some enterprises have low financing willingness due to the public welfare and long return cycle of infrastructure, the financing behavior of residents has emerged as a solution to ensure the sustainability of infrastructure construction. Based on the prospect theory from the perspective of residents, this research performed a three-party evolutionary game analysis to identify financing intention behavior among governments, businesses, and residents. Additionally, evolutionary stability strategy sensitivity analysis was used to identify the key factors of infrastructure financing behavior. The results of the tripartite evolutionary game indicate that residents’ expected income and expected financing cost play a major role in influencing their willingness to participate in infrastructure financing and present a significant correlation. Meanwhile, the government reward income, concomitant social reputation, and other parameters have different degrees of influence on the evolution results under certain conditions. Eventually, this study contributes to promoting the sustainable development of infrastructure construction by making policy suggestions in the aspects of resident financing amount allocation, incentive mechanisms, and safeguard measures.