Civil Resistance and Repression Backlash: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the 2011 Occupy U.C. Davis Protest

ABSTRACT This study asks how nonviolent protesters can strategically provoke authorities into violent responses to trigger repression backlash? Theoretically, principal‐agent theory is adopted to develop an extensive form game that captures the sequential dynamics that unfolded during the 2011 Occupy University of California Davis protest. The model captures how protesters can exploit information asymmetry between the principal and agent by provoking authorities into a violent reaction. Specifically, protesters utilized nonviolent direct action and were able to exploit the university administration's uncertainty about how its agents (university police) would behave under pressure. By provoking a response from a tough type of police, activists induced a violent reaction. In turn, this spurred negative feedback against the principal. Although a small‐scale protest, this case reveals the strategic basis underlying an age‐old concept of political jiu‐jitsu wherein nonviolent civil resistance turns the force of repression against the oppressor. Through formalizing backlash as a strategic interaction, this study demonstrates that this phenomenon is shaped by information asymmetry and uncertainty.