Populism and Political Appointments

ABSTRACT Do populist politicians increase the number of political appointments when they assume power? While the existing literature identifies politicization and political appointments as leading populist strategies, empirical evidence remains limited. Given the elusive nature of political appointments, it is challenging to assess their true extent in various contexts. Our research highlights how exemptions from a merit‐based process are a major indicator of politicization. Through a systematic analysis of all exemptions from competition or a merit‐based selection process in the Israeli civil service from January 1, 2000, to April 30, 2024, we provide empirical evidence linking populism and political appointments, suggesting deep and widespread politicization within the Israeli civil service. Our empirical evidence implies that Israel is probably among the leaders in this regard among developed democratic countries. In discussing our findings, we argue that, given the current global populist trend, public administration scholars should adopt a more critical stance toward political appointments.