The self and its values as content per se in terms of microgenesis and process philosophy

The idea of the self is still a philosophical problem for psychology, neurology, and even international law borrows ideas of the self to interpret the phenomenon of national identity and develop further regulations. The ambiguity surrounding the concept of the self creates challenges for academic and formal definitions, necessitating thorough analysis in this paper. Thus, the aim was to provide the reader with a series of non-substantial and non-dualistic versions of the self. In this paper the authors tried to approach the subject (the self) from microgenetic point of view based on works of Jason W. Brown. This analysis was justified by the non-linear, non-substantial and non-dualistic paradigms growing popular in globalised world and in academic communities. In particular, it was established that European Society for Process Thought, Claremont Process Nexus, International Process Network and other societies offer series of conferences on regular basis for many years to satisfy the need in more accurate definitions of the non-substantial versions of the self. It is demonstrated that duality of the self and the world can be eliminated by consideration of the self from the process point of view, that is, as a dynamical subject-superject, not a classic subject-object relation. The results of the paper can be used by PhD students, scholars and researchers in their further advances in neurology, psychology, law, identity studies, sociology that aim to provide both theoretical and practical solutions in their areas