PSPSP: A tool for automated verification of stateful protocols in Isabelle/HOL
In protocol verification, we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants such as Isabelle/HOL. The latter provides overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely, and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is nonnegligible. There are a few works that try to combine the advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step toward achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge, this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results, such as the soundness of a typed model.
Authors
- Achim D. Brucker (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6355-1200)
- Sebastian Mödersheim (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6901-8319)
- Andreas Viktor Hess (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6312-6311)
- Anders Schlichtkrull (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9212-6150)
Institutions
- University of Exeter (GB)
- Aalborg University (DK)
- Technical University of Denmark (DK)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Computer Security
- Published
- 2025-08-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0926227x251358741
- Primary Topic
- Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- HORIZON EUROPE Framework Programme