Rethinking Moral Responsibility: The Case of the Evil-Natured Tyrants in Confucian Thought

In general, the justification for the divine punishment in the Christian cosmos hinges on the notion of free will. Despite doctrinal complexities involving sin, grace, and divine sovereignty, individuals are held morally responsible for choosing evil over good. According to an ancient Chinese legend, however, the tyrant King Zhou (11th C. BCE) who lost his throne due to a changed mandate from Heaven was born with extreme evil tendencies. But if his evilness was determined before his birth and all his evil deeds are consequences of his natural tendencies, what might justify his punishment? Through an examination of Confucian responses to this question, this essay argues that Confucians did not ground moral responsibility in volitional freedom but rather in the extremity of one’s moral conduct. Their framework reveals a distinctive form of compatibilism—one in which blame is assigned not on the basis of freedom to choose otherwise but on how radically one’s actions deviate from shared ethical expectations. This suggests that the assumption of free will as a necessary condition for moral responsibility may reflect culturally specific intuitions, rather than a universal moral standard.