Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chains Incorporating Fairness-Concern Considerations Under Government Subsidies

Based on the theory of evolutionary game, considering the fair concern behavior of the third party remanufacturer in the operation process of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, constructing the evolutionary game model of the original product manufacturer, the third party remanufacturer and the government and carrying out the stability analysis, combining with the numerical simulation dynamics to study the impacts of the government's subsidy and punishment strength and the change of the third party remanufacturer's fair concern coefficient on the evolution results of the supply chain members' strategic behaviors. In order to provide reference for realizing the balance of interests of the three parties. The results show that the influence of the fairness concern coefficient of third-party remanufacturers on the construction of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is positively correlated, and the influence of government subsidies and penalties on the construction of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is differentiated by stages.